The SECURE Grid Act: The next generation of state energy security planning

For years, state energy security plans have focused on many of the same core questions: What infrastructure is critical? What could disrupt it? And how would the state respond if an emergency occurred?

Those questions still matter, but the energy landscape is changing. Utilities and state agencies are facing a wider range of threats than they were even a decade ago. Cybersecurity risks continue to grow. Supply chain disruptions can delay critical equipment for months. Extreme weather is putting increasing strain on energy infrastructure. As distributed energy resources (DERs) become more common, the systems that states rely on are becoming more complex and interconnected.

The proposed SECURE Grid Act reflects this changing environment. If enacted, it would expand state energy security planning requirements beyond traditional energy assurance activities and place greater emphasis on areas such as distribution system resilience, cybersecurity, and supply chain risks.

For state energy offices, the message is straightforward: the scope of energy security planning is getting broader, and the risks states need to consider are becoming more complex. Bringing together utilities, emergency managers, equipment suppliers, regulators, and other stakeholders can reveal dependencies and vulnerabilities that might otherwise go unnoticed until a crisis occurs.

Why the new energy security focus areas matter

The SECURE Grid Act would require states to look more closely at three areas that have become increasingly important to energy system resilience: local distribution systems, supply chains, and cybersecurity. Recent events have shown that each can be a source of significant disruption, even when generation and transmission assets remain available.

Historically, much of the discussion around grid resilience has focused on generation resources and the bulk power system. The SECURE Grid Act places additional emphasis on local distribution systems, requiring states to consider threats and vulnerabilities affecting the infrastructure that ultimately delivers electricity to homes, businesses, and critical facilities. This includes evaluating weather-related impacts, physical security risks, and potential mitigation strategies to improve reliability and end-use resilience.

This focus reflects a practical reality: many of the outages that customers experience originate on the distribution system. For example, during Hurricane Helene in 2024, millions of customers across the Carolinas lost power as downed trees, damaged poles, conductors, and local circuits sustained extensive damage. In many areas, generation capacity remained available, but restoring power depended on repairing local distribution assets.

The SECURE Grid Act would also require states to address supply chain risks associated with equipment used for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, while expanding engagement with equipment suppliers during the planning process.

The importance of this requirement became clear during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Utilities across the country faced lengthy delays in obtaining transformers, switchgear, conductors, and other critical components needed for routine maintenance and storm recovery. In some cases, lead times for large power transformers extended from months to more than a year, complicating infrastructure upgrades and resilience investments. These challenges highlighted that resilience is not solely about protecting existing infrastructure. It is also about understanding whether the equipment needed to maintain, repair, or rebuild that infrastructure will be available when damage occurs.

For state energy offices, this means asking broader questions: Which components are most critical? Do utilities have stockpiles of the most critical components? Where are potential supply chain bottlenecks? Are there alternative suppliers or contingency plans available during a large-scale event?

The legislation would further require states to evaluate cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities affecting local distribution systems, including risks that could ultimately impact the broader electric grid. As utilities deploy more advanced control systems, communications networks, distributed energy resources, and smart grid technologies, the number of potential cyber attack pathways continues to grow.